This chapter would like to show how a phenomenological approach to qualitative research can be a humanising force in the context of sCience, and how psychotherapy can be a humanising force in the context of technological culture. These two themes have a common concern, that is, to find alternatives to views and practices that depersonalise the human order.
Much has been written about the human implications of living in a world of proliferating technology, from Heidegger (1977) in the phenomenological tradition to Roszak (1992) and others in the field of ecopsychology. The pressure to become more specialised and efficient has become a powerful value and quest. Both contemporary culture and science enables a view of human identity that focuses on our 'parts' and the compartmentalisation of our lives into specialised 'bits'. This is a kind of abstraction which psychology has also, at times, taken in its concern to mimic the natural sciences. As such, it may unconsciously collude with a cultural trend to view humans as objects like other objects and so, fit 'normatively' into the emerging world of specialised and efficient systems.
This chapter describes a study that empowers an alternative view of both science and persons. As such I will pursue two levels of argument:
• How a phenomenological research method tries to remember an essentially human order in its view of persons, one that includes the qualities of a unique individual as well as the qualities of shared human existence.
• How the results of a study into psychotherapy reveal psychotherapy as a humanising force that enables clients to remember a sense of identity which transcends objectification, compartmentalisation, and specialisation.
Both these concerns address the overall task of the chapter to consider the role that they play in helping science and people remember the human scale of things, and thus how they function as humanising forces in different ways. I will begin with the first level of my argument about methodology and how it is able to reveal an adequate view of persons.
1. Phenomenological methodology as a humanising force I was interested in studying the nature of self-insight in psychotherapy: what is it about this kind of self-insight that makes a difference to the way clients feel and live? I will come back to this question later. At this point, however, I wish to articulate some of the methodological concerns I had in approaching such a task. I was familiar with a body of literature in the humanistic, existential, and phenomenological traditions that presented a coherent critique of simply adopting natural science as the paradigm for human science research (see, for example, Giorgi, 1970) . Within this tradition, I was particularly concerned with the critique that a natural-scientific world-view and methodological approach carried with it the danger of defining human beings in reductionistic and utilitarian ways, and that obscured the essence of the uniquely human dimensions of human identity. As such, I found in phenomenologically oriented methodologies the following three remedies:
• A language which cares for the human order.
• The importance of individual concrete experiences as a starting point for enquiry.
• 'Research results' as possibilities with actual variations; that is, expressing 'results' in ways that are not deterministic in nature.
I would like to briefly elaborate on each of these concerns.
A language which cares for the human order
As indicated in Chapter 4, phenomenologically informed methodology demonstrates a concern to care for our informants' voices, to care for the human phenomena that are being expressed, to care for how our own voices as writers and researchers reveal, conceal, and co-create, and to care for our readers as part of the ongoing conversation of understanding.
If one is faithful to the human order and cares in these ways, one finds words to show our informants' experiences that do not just reflect
